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This article examines how the prospects for building a sustainable 
peace, establishing a democratic polity and consolidating sovereignty 
in Kosovo are constrained by a number of endogenous and exogenous 
factors. The article highlights how the fragmentation of sovereignty 
is affected by Serb parallel structures and an overlapping and divided 
international presence, and how social emancipation is obstructed 
by weak governance, ethnic power-sharing and social injustice. The 
article argues that building sustainable peace is more likely when there 
is sufficient local autonomy and ownership of processes, an effective 
functioning of democracy and state institutions, as well as social 
emancipation and a locally-owned transformation of ethnic hostilities 
and differences. 
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Even after ten years of international administration and almost three years since 
its declaration of independence from Serbia, Kosovo continues to face ethnic and 
socio-economic problems, as well as fundamental challenges to its governance and 
sovereignty that have the potential to undermine the progress achieved and threaten 
Kosovo’s stability. Kosovo already illustrates some of the signs of a weak state: it does 
not exercise sovereign control over its entire territory, it has a weak economy and high 
unemployment. There are high levels of corruption and institutional weaknesses in the 
justice and law sectors, and Kosovo is making only slow progress towards international 
recognition and participation. 
Between 1999 and 2008, the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) aimed to 
establish a ‘liberal peace’ through establishing democratic institutions and a market-
oriented economy. However, the imposition of such an agenda for ‘democratization’ 
has arguably produced only a weak democracy, fragile peace and fragmented 
sovereignty.   
The purpose of this article is to examine how the building of a sustainable peace, 
the establishment of a democratic polity and the consolidation of sovereignty, is 
frustrated and constrained in Kosovo. The article highlights the fundamental factors 
that fragment Kosovo’s sovereignty both domestically and internationally, and delay 
socio-economic development within the country. It will argue that this fragmentation 
is affected both by the existence of parallel Serb institutions in the North of Kosovo, 
and by the presence of international bodies and agencies with overlapping and 
divided agendas.  Meanwhile, the potential for social emancipation in the country is 
obstructed by weak domestic governance, ethnic power-sharing and social injustice. 
Kosovo: From UNMIK to Ahtisaari and Beyond
In 1999, following the intensification of the conflict between the Serbian regime and 
Kosovo Albanians, and NATO’s intervention, the UN was tasked to govern Kosovo 
through an Interim Administration Mission (UNMIK), as outlined in UN Security 
Council (UNSC) Resolution 1244. The Resolution neither specified the scope of 
UNMIK’s authority - whether it would exercise sole authority or share power with local 
institutions - nor the structure the mission would have (Zaum 2007:132). 








































However, UNMIK later decided to transfer its competencies gradually to the Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government (PISG), pending the determination of Kosovo’s future 
status. A broad power-sharing mechanism was established within central and local 
government to reserve seats and secure space for ethnic minority participation in 
politics, which was rationalized as a way to facilitate the reintegration of communities 
and ethnic reconciliation.  
However, from 1999-2003, UNMIK delayed transferring power to local institutions, and 
did little to promote local ownership of reconstruction processes. This was partly due 
to Kosovo’s unresolved political status and the fear that transferring power to Kosovo’s 
local institutions would be viewed by Kosovo-Serbs as a threat. In an attempt to 
balance these fears, the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General to Kosovo, 
Michael Steiner, had outlined benchmarks in April 2002 that had to be achieved before 
Kosovo’s political status could be discussed (UN Security Council 2002:3). However by 
2004, events on the ground, including the March Riots, put the discussions of Kosovo’s 
status firmly on the agenda. 
Two years and two rounds of UN-led negotiations between Serb authorities and 
Kosovo representatives failed to achieve a consensual solution.  Given the deadlock, 
a group of mainly Western countries saw no alternative but to support UN Special 
Envoy Ahtisaari’s recommendation to grant independence to Kosovo, ‘supervised 
initially by the international community’ and to implement his Comprehensive Status 
Settlement (CSS) (UN Secretary General 2007:3). As the Ahtisaari Proposal did not 
receive sufficient support within the UN Security Council due to the anticipated veto 
by Russia and China, the United States together with a group of the European Union 
member states, facilitated a unilateral declaration of independence. 
Accordingly, on 17 February 2008, Kosovan political representatives declared Kosovo 
‘an independent and sovereign state’ (Kosovo Assembly 2008). The Declaration 
of Independence was framed ‘in full accordance’ with the Ahtisaari Proposal and 
expressed a commitment to cooperate with the international community to ensure 
the  ‘future peace, prosperity and stability’ of Kosovo (Kosovo Assembly 2008). Despite 
its contested status, Kosovo so far has been recognized by seventy-five out of 192 UN 
Member States.
The Ahtisaari Proposal envisages a new format for international presence, tasked to 
supervise the status settlement and to gradually pass full governance power to local 
authorities. However, the international presence in post-independence Kosovo does 
not operate as defined in the Ahtisaari Proposal. Due to a lack of consensus within their 
respective organizations, UNMIK, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) and the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) remain 
neutral with regard to Kosovo’s status. However, although they remain formally status-
neutral under the UN framework of UNSC Resolution 1244, the three organizations 
each take a distinct approach in how they cooperate with their Kosovo counterparts, 
and in their recognition of the  sovereignty of Kosovo. 
The International Civilian Office (ICO) is the only status-supportive international body. 
The ICO is mandated to strengthen Kosovo’s domestic sovereignty by supporting 








































decentralization and the protection of minorities, and by improving governance 
and abolishing Serbian parallel structures - in theory at least - to minimize Serbian 
interference in Kosovo’s domestic affairs. 
Although EULEX operates under UNSC Resolution 1244, its mission aims to strengthen 
the sector of law and justice by advising, mentoring, and monitoring the work of 
courts, police, and customs, which function as institutions of independent Kosovo 
(EU Council 2008). Notwithstanding its commitment to status-neutrality, the UN 
presence in Kosovo undertakes three main functions: monitoring and reporting, 
facilitating dialogue between Prishtina and Belgrade on issues of practical concern, 
and facilitating, where necessary and possible, Kosovo’s engagement in international 
agreements (UN Secretary General 2008:5). UNMIK still holds some administrative 
functions in the North of Kosovo, where its key partners are Serb institutions within 
key public sectors.  The OSCE continues to support local governance and communities 
in Kosovo, but operates under a status-neutral framework. OSCE activities are now 
reconfigured to focus on early warning and proactive monitoring of local institutions 
and community rights.
During the two phases of international administration (before and after Kosovo’s 
independence), the international community, together with local actors, failed to 
lay the seeds of a stable peace in Kosovo. While the international community was 
interested in maintaining a fragile peace and stability, Kosovar authorities demanded 
independence and state building, and this dual agenda allowed Belgrade to exploit 
the situation in order to promote its own national interests in the bargaining process 
in Kosovo. 
The consequences of Kosovo’s independence not being universally accepted and a 
lack of clarity regarding the goals and mandate of the international actors, combined 
with insufficient coordination of their roles and responsibilities, challenge newly-
independent Kosovo in three ways.  Firstly, this enables the ‘parallel’ Serb institutions 
to influence and interfere in North Kosovo, through tolerating their illegal activities 
and restricting the capacity of Kosovar authorities to extend their administrative and 
political involvement to the North.  This creates divided loyalties among the population 
in the North, and undermines Kosovo’s territorial integrity and domestic sovereignty. 
These parallel structures are tolerated due to the high antagonism between the 
ethnic communities living in the North of Kosovo, but also due to the broader issue of 
Serbia and its international supporters. Secondly, a divided international response to 
crucial post-status peacebuilding and state building cannot effectively enable Kosovo’s 
institutions to implement vital reforms in the justice and governance sectors. Moreover, 
the international presence tolerates corruption and political unaccountability amongst 
local politicians in exchange for ensuring stability. 
Finally, the ambiguity over Kosovo’s status limits its sovereignty externally.  The 
overlapping agendas of the international presence and its internal division exacerbate 
the situation, further discouraging international recognition of Kosovo and preventing it 
from participating in international organizations. The international presence therefore 
contributes both to Kosovo’s domestic failure to establish the rule of law and good 
governance, and to Kosovo’s international failure to consolidate its sovereignty.  








































Serb Parallel Structures 
Following the war in 1999, Serbs in Kosovo established parallel structures within 
the sectors of security, education, health and public services that were supported 
by and relied heavily on the Belgrade authorities. Created initially to boycott the UN 
administration of Kosovo, their main function became to resist UN-created, Albanian-
led, self-governing local institutions. Belgrade uses these structures to influence local 
Serbs, to manipulate and destabilize processes in Kosovo, and to retain bargaining 
incentives for Serbia’s own interests (New Kosovo Report 2008). This creates a volatile 
environment; the Mayor of Mitrovica Municipality (South), Avni Kastrati, described 
the North of Kosovo as a place where the lack of rule of law and the activities of 
parallel structures and criminal groups result in frequent violent incidents; bombings, 
attacks against non-Serb citizens, and even murder (Gazeta Express 2010).
As a predominantly Serb area, North Kosovo is therefore under the de facto control 
of these Serb parallel structures, which substantially limits the capacity of Kosovar 
institutions to extend their authority in this part of the country. These structures also 
constitute a significant obstacle to the representation and participation of Serbs in 
Kosovar institutions; they constrain the functioning of these institutions within Serb-
populated areas and therefore threaten the overall territorial integrity and internal 
security of Kosovo. In some respects the Serb parallel structures in Kosovo have the 
attributes of ‘states-within-states’; micro-entities that may emerge from a secession, 
protracted civil war or state collapse, which perform revenue collection and extraction, 
public and service-oriented activities, and challenge the legitimacy and authority of 
the central government (Kingston and Spears 2004:3-7). 
Indeed, the problem of North Kosovo is the main source of potential destabilization 
in Kosovo.  Although any intervention by Kosovar authorities would trigger a violent 
reaction, the international presence on the other hand could play a fundamental role 
in restoring law and order. Since the Kosovo government cannot access North Kosovo, 
the presence of status-neutral institutions such as UNMIK, the OSCE and EULEX is 
expected to help bridge this gap. However, these institutions are producing mixed 
results, largely due to their constrained mandates. 
Following Serb anti-independence riots in 2008, district and municipal courts in North 
Mitrovica ceased to operate and UNMIK failed to restore them. EULEX attempted 
to reinstate the courts, installing Serb, Albanian and international judges, but the 
initiative stalled following objections raised by the Kosovo Government concerning 
the nomination of Serb judges from Belgrade (Koha Ditore 2010a). 
Equally, EULEX has not yet established a functioning customs regime in North Kosovo. 
During the 2008 anti-independence riots, Serbs destroyed the two border crossings in 
the North of Kosovo (Gates 1 and 31), creating a vacuum that facilitates the smuggling 
of people and untaxed goods between Serbia and Kosovo. Currently, these border 
points are managed by EULEX officials who merely record the entry and exit of goods; 
they do not however collect revenues, as they have not yet established where to 
send the revenues. The profits arising from this unresolved customs regime generally 








































provide income for the Serb parallel structures and often line the pockets of criminal 
gangs (Medija Centar 2010). Indeed, EU and UN officials concur that other criminal 
activities, notably drug trafficking, are exacerbated in the area and pose a significant 
regional problem (Crisis Group 2010:19).  
In January 2010, the Kosovar Government, in consultation with the ICO, produced 
a common ‘Strategy for Northern Kosovo’, which aims to strengthen the rule of 
law, address governance issues in the three Northern municipalities, implement 
decentralization to create a North Mitrovica municipality, and improve the social and 
economic situation (Anon 2010:1). Despite its comprehensive approach, the Strategy 
received limited support from UNMIK, EULEX and the OSCE. The main obstacles were 
strong objections from the Belgrade authorities and those running the Serb parallel 
structures; they interpreted the strategy as a dangerous provocation and called on 
UNMIK and EULEX to remain status-neutral and to condemn the strategy (UN Secretary 
General 2010:4). There is concern that the parallel structures may react violently to 
Kosovar-Serbs if they respond to and respect Prishtina authority (UN Secretary General 
2010:3). Meanwhile, UNMIK has openly expressed that they were neither consulted 
nor included by Kosovo authorities and the ICO in drafting the strategy, nor did they 
share a role in its planned implementation (UN Security Council 2010:3-4). 
Alongside these failed attempts to establish a functioning state, it is important to 
note that in practice, the parallel structures and the international presence mutually 
reinforce each other at the expense of Kosovar authorities: the parallel structures 
legitimize and justify the continuation of the UN presence; likewise, the UN and OSCE 
presence in the North of Kosovo facilitates the de facto functioning of Serb parallel 
structures by hindering the exercise of authority by the Kosovo government.
The State of Governance in Kosovo 
For countries in democratic transitions and fragile states, and in post-conflict situations, 
prioritising good governance is seen as a key requirement in order to address high 
levels of corruption and unaccountable practices, unequal distribution of resources, 
and social division (Smith 2007:6).  However, Kosovo’s potential to enable socio-
economic development and a functioning democracy is restricted by poor governance, 
contested ethnic power-sharing arrangements, and social injustice. 
Freedom House, an international non-governmental organisation, and others 
acknowledged that prior to 2010, national democratic governance in Kosovo was 
stable, and that election processes were free and fair. However, the national elections 
held in November 2010 were viewed locally as undemocratic and to some extent 
manipulated, because political parties in several municipalities misused votes, 
manipulating the election results in favour of the incumbent Prime Minister Hashim 
Thaci (Koha Ditore 2010b). Despite the positive assessment of international observers, 
local pressure by political parties and social movements resulted in the recount of 
forty per cent of ballots and repeat elections, in three contested regions. This certainly 
poses questions about democratic practices, the role of international investment in 
democratisation, and the legitimacy of the next government in Kosovo. 








































The 2010 Freedom House Report acknowledged an improvement in ensuring the 
smooth functioning of local authorities, as well as the completion of the legislative 
process for decentralization (Freedom House 2010:274). The report acknowledged 
that civil society groups do monitor corruption, compliance with human rights statutes 
and the implementation of fair laws, but warned that ‘these groups often struggled 
to develop their own agendas... remaining dependent on foreign donors’ (Freedom 
House 2010:273). 
The judiciary is one of the weakest sectors in Kosovo’s rule of law. The 2010 Freedom 
House report blamed this situation on the ‘legacy of the previous nine years’ as 
‘Kosovo’s body of applicable laws remains a series of divided areas between UNMIK 
regulations, laws adopted by the Assembly of Kosovo in accordance with the new 
Constitution, certain former Yugoslav laws, and the laws of Serbia through Belgrade’s 
parallel Kosovo structures in Kosovo Serb areas, especially in northern Kosovo’ 
(Freedom House 2010:276).  Indeed, the 2010 EU Progress Report notes that the 
justice system remains weak, inefficient and vulnerable to political interference, and 
that Kosovo’s judiciary is still in need of reform (EU Commission 2010:11). 
Problems with inefficient governance, high levels of corruption, election irregularities 
and the failure to establish the rule of law has impacted negatively on civic trust in 
institutions, on participation by citizens at the local level, and on civic activism. In 
the 2000 elections (the first post-war elections) nearly eighty per cent of Kosovo 
citizens turned out to vote, but by 2007, turnout had dropped to forty per cent. Civic 
satisfaction with Kosovo’s main institutions shows a similar decrease; in 2003, the 
Kosovo government and assembly enjoyed over seventy per cent of citizens’ support, 
this dropped in 2006 and 2009 to approximately forty per cent. Similarly, while UNMIK 
enjoyed forty per cent satisfaction in 2003, this was at a mere fifteen per cent by 2009 
(UNDP 2010).
Ethnic Power-sharing in Kosovo
As part of the overall democratization process, the international community in general 
has favoured ethnic power-sharing, autonomy and self-governance as a strategy to 
encourage the integration of all ethnic groups and to avoid partition. As a result of 
power-sharing deals, a quota system of representation in the central decision-making 
bodies is reserved for minority ethnic groups (Roeder and Rothchild 2005:31). This 
strategy includes the decentralization of power (i.e. the transferral of authority and 
responsibility for public functions) to intermediate and local governments.  This strategy 
aims to accommodate ethnic interests more effectively by bringing institutions of local 
government closer to the people.  
One argument though, is that power-sharing arrangements empower ethnic elites, 
which risks escalating the conflict and delaying the prospects for a self-sustaining 
peace (Roeder and Rothchild 2005). Ethnic power-sharing can further limit democracy 
by discouraging political competition, restricting the electorate’s choices and by 
disabling public accountability. Ethnic elites can harm the peace agreement through 
abuse of power and by exploiting the government resources under their management, 








































by increasing governmental inefficiency through higher administrative costs and the 
duplication of decision-making agencies, and finally by complicating political and social 
change through governmental rigidity (Roeder and Rothchild 2005:36-41). 
Ahtisaari’s Proposal emphasized the importance of addressing the needs and concerns of 
Kosovar-Serbs through extensive government decentralization. Decentralized regions, 
where the Serb community constitute a majority, enjoy extensive financial autonomy; 
they can accept transparent funding from Serbia and can participate in inter-municipal 
partnerships and cross-border cooperation with Serbian institutions (UN Secretary 
General 2007). After 2008, most international and local politicians acknowledged that 
decentralization and the creation of new Serb majority municipalities was essential 
for sustaining and stabilizing the Serb community in the new state and for overcoming 
the unsettled political and administrative situation in North Kosovo (KIPRED 2009:3). 
Despite this, the decentralization process is progressing very slowly, mainly due to 
Serbia’s objection to Kosovo’s independence and objection to the modes of municipal 
power-sharing. 
The loudest voice against decentralisation in Kosovo is from Levizja Vetëvendosje (the 
Self-Determination Movement).  According to Vetëvendosje:
Through decentralization, Serbia is intending to expand and define the borders 
of enclaves, create continuous territory through enclaves with the planned 
return of  Serbs by the government of Serbia, take the high peaks of hills and 
mountains with indisputable strategic and military importance, and legitimize 
its parallel structures in Kosovo ( Vetëvendosje 2006:13).
Even though there is evidence that the Serbian population wants to participate in 
and support decentralization, the strong presence and influence of Belgrade through 
its satellite network of local leaders does not appear to allow this (ECMI 2009). This 
clearly shows how powerless the Serbian population has become, mainly due to their 
dependency on self-appointed leadership and the external influence of Belgrade. 
Moreover, this self-imposed exclusion by local leaders - not the Serb population 
in general - has the immediate effect of ‘discouraging the Serb community from 
participating in and shaping the structures of the Kosovar state, creating a real risk for 
marginalisation and long-term division, even if the parallel structures cease to exist’ 
(ECMI 2009). 
Social Injustice in Kosovo 
As part of the post-conflict reconstruction of Kosovo, the international community 
has installed the framework for a market-oriented economy. Although this economic 
system has shown modest progress and macroeconomic stability, Kosovo’s economy 
is highly dependent on financial and technical assistance from the international 
community and Kosovar diaspora. Nearly one-third of Kosovo’s economy comprises 
remittances from the diaspora, donor-financed activities and foreign aid.  As poverty 
is high, a large number of people, particularly unemployed and vulnerable groups, 
receive social protection in the form of social assistance, or pensions and special 
schemes for war invalids (World Bank 2007:28). 








































Nonetheless, despite the low-income inequality gap, remittances from the diaspora, 
and social assistance, Kosovo’s citizens remain the poorest in Europe with an average 
per capita annual income of 2,500 USD (World Bank 2007). High unemployment (over 
forty-five per cent) is the main concern for Kosovar society; it encourages migration and 
promotes an informal economy and the black market, but also creates the conditions 
for social unrest, and is a trigger for wider destabilization. 
One of the attributes of liberal peacebuilding is establishing market-oriented economies, 
where in many post-conflict cases has resulted in social exclusion and threatening of 
peace The situation in Kosovo shows a low investment in the welfare and security 
of individuals (Beha and Visoka 2010). Although the international community has 
been largely focused on the issue of inter-ethnic violence, the Internal Security Sector 
Review found that ‘for the people of Kosovo high unemployment, a lack of economic 
development and widespread poverty have created an atmosphere of insecurity’ 
(UNDP 2006:xiii). The same report goes further to argue that ‘economic instability has 
exacerbated problems such as ethnic violence, corruption, increased crime rates and 
contributed to a growth in mistrust of Kosovo’s key institutions of government, both 
international and indigenous’ (UNDP 2006:xiii). The EU 2010 Progress Report for Kosovo 
points out that ‘the weak rule of law, corruption, uncertainty over property rights and 
high interest rates continue to impact negatively on the business environment and 
prevent economic development’ (EU Commission 2010:2). Hence it is suggested that 
the process of economic reform should prioritize welfare and empowerment of the 
most marginalized; international actors should support and provide guidance, but 
leave local actors and communities to take the lead in the development of a market-
orientated economy (Richmond 2010:33). 
Conjectures for Kosovo’s Future
Today, peace in Kosovo is stable but not sustainable. The path to sustainable peace 
is obstructed by fragile governance, fragmented ethnic power-sharing and social 
injustice, as well as by the overlapping and contested international presences that 
allow the functioning of Serb parallel structures and hold the situation of North Kosovo 
in limbo. These obstacles are the key factors that will shape the future of Kosovo.
There are two separate developments that will influence the next stage of Kosovo 
politics. Firstly, a round of dialogue that started on March 2011 between Kosovo and 
Serbia, facilitated by the EU and UN, will determine the fate of North of Kosovo, the 
integration of Serb community within Kosovar society, and will clarify the overall 
relationship between Kosovo and Serbia. 
While Kosovo authorities claim that the next round of negotiations in this dialogue will 
focus on issues of mutual benefit, encompassing unresolved issues relating to missing 
persons, border administration, and economic and security cooperation, the Serb 
community will seek to bring to the forefront either the partition of North of Kosovo, 
or the creation of an autonomy autonomous region in the North with extensive self-
governance rights that will enable Belgrade to wield greater political and economic 
influence in the region. So far the position of the international community is to 








































accept a compromise agreement between the negotiating Kosovar and Serb parties, 
to overcome their differences in order to progress within the European integration 
agenda. In the end, whatever the outcomes of the negotiations will be, the factors 
and obstacles discussed above increase the potential for the destabilization and 
uncertainty unless there is a transparent dialogue that recognizes the differences and 
the interests of both parties.  
Secondly, the transformation of Vetëvendosje from a social movement into a political 
party and its participation in the November 2010 national elections in Kosovo, signified 
the emergence of a new populist political agenda in Kosovo. Vetëvendosje’s political 
agenda, which is gaining extensive popularity, seeks on the one hand to encourage 
active citizenship, a welfare state and economic development in the area of production 
and employment, and on the other hand seeks to end international governance and 
supervision in Kosovo, in doing so to establish a new partnership between locals 
and internationals that facilitates and supports the socio-economic development of 
Kosovo. 
However, a critical issue here concerns the emerging ethnic politics that risk further 
segregation between the Albanian majority and the Serb minority (and other 
minorities), which could effectively delay ethnic reconciliation and social cohesion in 
Kosovo. This ethnic-based confrontation could be exploited within the new institutions, 
where a relatively high number of seats allocated to Vetëvendosje and Serb political 
representatives could intensify nationalist discourse.  
Arguably, to avoid any potential destabilization in Kosovo, certain changes are 
necessary, including the creation of a functioning, democratic state with coherent, 
legal, and representative political structures, a sustainable peace between Kosovar-
Serbs and Kosovar-Albanians, and promoting mutual recognition and cooperation 
between the Republic of Kosovo and the Republic of Serbia that would finally open 
the way for common integration within Euro-Atlantic structures, as a guarantee for 
long-term stability in the entire region.
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